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Trust in the guise of belief1 
 
2nd Place Prize in Annual Robert Papazian Competition at IJPS 
 




What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can 
lead one to think that it is a doxastic state (cf. Adler 1994, Baier 1986, 
Hieronymi 2008, Keren 2014, McMyler 2011) but also features that can 
lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state (cf. Baker 1987, Faulkner 
2011, Jones 1996, McLeod 2011). This has even lead some philosophers 
to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world 
and world-to-mind direction of fit (Holton 1996), or to give up on the 
idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had (Hardin 2004, 
Simpson 2012). Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to 
mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be 
thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to 
explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only 
such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse 
features of trust.  As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust 
provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a 
comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of 




1. A ‘Mixed’ Mental State Pragmatism 
What is trust? What kind of mental state is it? Is it a belief-like (doxastic) state, 
an affective, emotive state, or perhaps a kind of a stance (perhaps a 
‘participant stance’ which comes along with evidential standards for judging 
the trustworthiness of a fellow person2)? There currently does not seem to be 
any real consensus as regards the answer to this question. Some think that 																																																								
1 With many thanks to Boudewijn de Bruin, Gail Leckie, Marco Meyer, Michael 
Morris, Mahon O’Brien, Alex Oliver, Rik Peels, Sarah Sawyer, Rowland Stout, Chris 
Thompson, Rik Peels, Jens Van ‘t Klooster, and an audience at the University of 
Southampton Philosophy Research Seminar, for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
2 As well as involving thinking it appropriate to have certain reactive attitudes on 
discovery of a betrayal of trust.  
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trust is (partly or wholly) a belief (e.g. Adler 1994, Baier 1986, Hieronymi 
2008, Keren 2014, McMyler 2011); some think it is a non-doxastic mental state 
such as an emotive state (e.g. Baker 1987, Faulkner 2011, Jones 1996, McLeod 
2011), or a non-doxastic disposition to rely on a trusted party (Kappel 
forthcoming), and some think it is a kind of a stance, a “participant stance” 
(very influentially Holton 1996).  
 
The reason for the disagreement is that trust has properties that make it look 
like a doxastic state and properties that make it look like a non-doxastic state, 
to the point where people even have given up on thinking that there is a 
univocal account of trust to be had (cf. Hardin 2004, Simpson 2012) or to 
suggest that trust has what Michael Smith (1987) argued no mental state 
could have – both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit (Holton 
1996).  
 
I want to propose what I am tentatively going to call the ‘guise of belief’ thesis 
about the metaphysics of trust. That is, I want to propose that trust is the 
name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was 
to be thought of in what I will call ‘pragmatist’ terms3. We ought not to think 
of belief in fully ‘pragmatist’ terms, because belief is involuntary. But other 
mental states  (I think trust is one, and intention another) rightly deserve 
pragmatist treatment. Let’s call the thesis I want to defend ‘the trust in the 
																																																								
3 By ‘pragmatist’ I don’t really have in mind the sort of view usually associated with, 
say, C.S. Pierce as I will explain (I think there is a relation between the view I call 
‘pragmatism’ and the latter, but I will not have the space to explore that relation).  
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guise of belief thesis’ - TG for short. I want to argue that TG is the only theory 
of trust that can account for all the diverse features of trust that have 
putatively been identified, and that this should warrant further investigation 
of the view. Here is a first stab at defining TG: 
 
TG S trusts that someone else S’ Φ-s iff S voluntarily p-lieves that S’ Φ-s.4 
 
The definition above is hardly very informative unless what ‘p-lieves’ is 
defined5. Here is what I have in mind: 
 
P-lief S p-lieves that p iff ascribing a belief that p to S is the proximate best 
way to explain S’s internal and/or external behaviour.  
 
And now I need to explain what I mean by the ‘proximate best’ explanation. 
First, though, let me say something about the general ‘Neo-Wittgenstienian’ 
‘pragmatist’ account of what are our mental states underlying this. I think 
that Bob Stalnaker summarises the view nicely with this: 
 
Rational creatures are essentially agents. Representational states 
should be understood primarily in terms of the role that they play in 
																																																								
4 Background assumption: trust is a three-place relation - “person B is trustworthy 
with respect to person A and action Φ (or domain of interaction D)” (Keren 2014, p. 
2595).  This is the standard view in the literature on trust; however see Domenicucci 
& Holton (forthcoming) for a dissenting view.  
5 I am not going to say anything here about what the content of the p-lief is; what it is 
to be ‘trustworthy’. Here I follow the literature in bifurcating between discussions on 
‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’. However, I find the account of trustworthiness in 
Hardin 2004 attractive. 
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the characterization and explanation of action…and, according to this 
picture, our conceptions of belief and attitudes pro and con are 
conceptions of states which explain why a rational agent does what he 
does.6 (Stalnaker 1987, p. 4). 
 
According to this ‘pragmatist’ picture, there cannot be any fully ‘private’ 
mental states, in the sense that having a mental state must be associated with 
some actual or possible action(s) (whether a further mental action, or 
otherwise): since, as Anscombe puts it, if having a mental state didn’t 
“guarantee” some action, “then what is there left for it to be but a 
bombination in a vacuum?” (Anscombe 1957, p. 52). The idea, that I am 
labelling ‘pragmatist’ here is the reductive one that belief (and mental states 
in general) are nothing but states that explain action. 
I think the question of whether to treat belief in this pragmatist manner is 
orthogonal to the question of whether belief is a ‘dispositional’ (e.g. 
Braithwaite 1967, Schwitzgebel 2002) or ‘occurent’ (e.g. Bogdan 1986) mental 
state (and as such is compatible with the failure or behaviourism). I think this 
because a pragmatist account of belief leaves it an open question whether it is 
more explanatory to think of belief as a representational, occurent state or a 
dispositional state7.   
More controversially, however, I think that it is (also) an open question 
whether we should be pragmatists about all our mental states. That is, I take 																																																								
6  See also Lewis’ “Rationalization Principle” (Lewis 1974). 
7 As I said the sense of ‘private’ I was referring to earlier is just about it’s 
guaranteeing some mental or physical action, and not whether it’s a representational 
or ‘occurent’ state.  
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the following question to be open: are there some mental states that resist 
pragmatist treatment (while some do not)? If we answer in the affirmative, 
these mental states would then be essentially private occurrences, 
‘bombinating' – but not always causing a shift – among our actions (mental or 
otherwise). I think that belief is such a state: belief is not merely a state postited 
to explain action.  And here is an extremely simple argument for why: 
(1) If belief is rightly to be thought of along pragmatist lines, believing at 
will is possible. 
(2) Believing at will is not possible. 
(3)  Belief ought not to be thought of along pragmatist lines.  
I think that we cannot believe at will, along with most people writing on the 
issue.8 When I say that ‘believing at will is not possible’ I mean that we cannot 
generate belief that p either simply by intending to believe that p or by doing 
something that will directly cause us to believe that p (cases where I make it 
the case that p in order to believe that p notwithstanding, c.f. Feldman 2001). 
My case for (1) I borrow from Hedden 2015. His argument, however, is the 
obverse of mine - something like as follows: 
(1) If belief is to be thought of along pragmatist lines, believing at will is 
possible. 
(4) Belief ought to be thought of along pragmatist lines. 
(5) Believing at will is possible.  
As Hedden puts it: 
																																																								
8 C.f. Peels forthcoming for an outlier position. 
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According to [a] Pragmatist picture of belief, whether an agent has a 
given belief is determined in part by how she acts. In particular, 
whether an agent has a given belief is determined in part by how well 
attributing to her that belief would rationalize and explain her actions. 
Since an agent has voluntary control over her actions, and hence has 
control over one of the key factors that determine what she counts as 
believing, she thereby also has voluntary control over what she 
believes. (Hedden 2015, pp. 495 – 496). 
Clearly, as they say, one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens!9 I 
endorse Hedden’s defence of (1): that under pragmatism whether an agent 
has a belief is determined in part by how well attributing her that belief 
explains her actions, and agents have voluntary control over their actions.10 
However, his defence of (4,5) seems to me to be predicated on the idea that 
endorsing pragmatism about mental states is an all or nothing affair – that one 
cannot be a pragmatist about some mental states but not others. And this is 
the idea I here seek to deny. I want to show that denying it is not hopeless by 
showing that a ‘mixed’ mental state pragmatism can help us make sense of 
trust.  
So, returning to my definition of p-lief, recall:  																																																								
9 Please note, however, that I am here only really articulating not arguing for my view. The 
argument for the view will come in later sections. One could reply here on Hedden’s behalf 
with the suggestion that his version of the thesis that we have doxastic control is compatible 
with at least some of the ways people have of being doxastic involuntarists. Alston 1989 has 
some very persuasive arguments in defence of the view that no version of the theses that we 
have doxastic control is true (and his is a very comprehensive treatment of all the different 
ways one could take that thesis). I am - for the purposes of this paper – relying on the success 
of Alston’s paper, but only in terms of how I think the view is most easily or best understood, 
at first blush! As I re-iterate, the arguments I marshal in support for the view comes in the later 
sections.  
10 I think Hedden does a great job fencing off potential worries with this. I refer the reader to 
his paper if she has such worries.  
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P-lief S p-lieves that p iff ascribing a belief that p to S is the proximate best 
way to explain S’s internal or external behaviour.  
I can now explain what I mean by ‘proximate best’ explanation. By ‘proximate 
best’ explanation, I mean an explanation where we need to imagine the 
absence of an undercutting defeater in order for it to be the ‘best’. A 
proximate best explanation would have been the best had a given 
undercutting defeater not obtained. The relevant undercutting defeater here 
is that we have reason to think that belief resists pragmatist treatment.  
Because belief is involuntary (and thus possibly private) the ‘best’ explanation 
as to S’s mental and non-mental actions might involve ascription of a belief 
that p to S, but it might nevertheless be possible that S does not believe that p. 
In other words, knowledge that pragmatism does not apply to belief works as 
a kind of undercutting defeater for the putative explanation.  
This is not to say that beliefs do not explain action, but they would if they 
were voluntary. Rather, the claim is that belief cannot be nothing but a state 
posited to explain action because it is involuntary.11 Now, some philosophers 
think that belief has a constitutive norm or aim such that belief’s 
voluntariness is ruled out on conceptual grounds (e.g. Boghossian 2003, 
McHugh 2012, Setiya 2014, Shah & Velleman 2005, Steglich-Petersen 200912). 
This might make it look impossible to even imagine what ‘belief’ would look 
like were it not involuntary, such that we cannot conceive of the 
																																																								
11 Thanks to Rowland Stout for suggesting this clarification.  
12 For arguments that belief is merely contingently involuntary, see Booth 2017 and 
Bennett 1990. 
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counterfactual situation relevant for ascription of p-lief13. Crucially, however, 
what the doxastic constitutivist accounts above (unanimously claim to) rule 
out on conceptual grounds is that one can believe something as a result of an 
intention to believe it: that an intention to believe that p itself can cause a belief 
that p. However, if pragmatism about belief were true, then the sense in 
which we could believe at will is that by acting in a certain way we could 
directly make it the case that we have one doxastic attitude over another – it 
would not be the intention itself that has the causal power. As Hedden puts it: 
For all I have said, it might be that in some cases, by acting one way 
rather than another, you can make it the case that you have one set of 
beliefs rather than another, even though it is impossible for you to 
form an intention to believe p and have that intention cause you to 
come to believe p. (Hedden 2015, p. 508). 
As such, my claim that we cannot believe at will (in a way that is 
incompatible with doxastic pragmatism) should be taken to describe a 
contingent fact about belief in this world.  
Also note that p-lief is not the attitude that has been sometimes called 
‘acceptance’. This is because, at least on certain prominent accounts, 
acceptance is ‘context-specific’ (e.g. Bratman 1992, Cohen 1989, Frost-Arnold 
2014). Roughly, one accepts that p only if one takes oneself to have good 
reasons to act in light of p in a given context, where ‘good reasons’ can denote 
non-epistemic reasons (so ‘acceptance’ can be voluntary where belief is not). 
Here is Bratman explicating the notion: 
																																																								
13 Thanks to [anonymous] for bringing this point to my attention. 
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The three of us need jointly to decide whether to build a house 
together. We agree to base our deliberations on the assumption that the 
total cost of the project will include the top of the estimated range 
offered by each of the sub-contractors. We facilitate our group 
deliberations and decisions by agreeing on a common framework of 
assumptions. We each accept these assumptions in this context, the 
context of our group’s deliberations, even though it may well be that 
none of us believes these assumptions or accepts them in other, more 
individualistic contexts. (Bratman 1992, p. 7). 
As Frost-Arnold (2014) notes, for instance, if one were asked to place a bet on 
the cost of the house, one presumably would not take the highest sub- 
contractor estimates for granted in one’s calculations. Like belief, however, p-
lief is not context-dependent in the way that acceptance is meant to be above.  
Further, it is possible that one accept that p (and plan to act on p) even if one 
ends up not acting in light of p, while p-lieving that p guarantees some action 
(mental or otherwise) relevant to p. Though one of course could be a 
pragmatist about acceptance and hold that accepting that p must guarantee 
some action(s) relevant to p (such that ascribing acceptance is the best 
explanation of one’s actions), but need not necessarily involve acting in a way 
such that p is a premise in one’s practical deliberations.  
 
The obvious objection is to wonder whether p-lief is really sufficient for trust. 
Does Sam trust Adam when he p-lieves him to be cheating on him, for 
example? I think the concern is allayed simply by recalling two things about 
	 10	
the account: first, not just any p-lief is sufficient for trust. The p-lief has to be 
voluntary, and concern the actions (or a domain of interaction) of another 
subject. Second, on the account, trust is a three-place relation. Sam does not 
trust Adam, if by that we mean that Sam does not trust Adam to be faithful to 
him. But I do not think there is anything infelicitous about saying that Sam 
trusts Adam not to be faithful – especially when we bear in mind that Sam 
trusts voluntarily, and so possibly against his evidence.  
 
My argument for TG is that it can univocally account for all the different 
properties of trust, where all other accounts seem to fail.14  The relevant 
properties are the following: 
 
Seemingly Non-doxastic Properties 
a. We can trust at will. 
b. We can trust against our (subjective) evidence. 
c. We can trust therapeutically.  
d. Our trust can be betrayed; trust is not reliance. 





Seemingly Doxastic Properties 
 
f. Trust that S will φ is incompatible with belief that S will not-φ. 
g. Trust in S’s testimony that p is incompatible with belief that not-p.  
h. Rational trust can generate (epistemically) justified belief.  
 
																																																								
14 Of course some people deny that some of these putative properties are genuine 
properties, I will do something to parry their objections in what follows. However, 
given that there is clearly no consensus here, the fact that there is a theory that can 
account for all these diverse (seemingly incompatible) features should be thought to 
be something people working on trust should take on board. This is the result I seek.  
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In §2 I show that TG can account for fg; In §3 that it can account for abcde. 
Throughout I compare TG with its competitors, and argue that it’s the best 
theory that can account for all of abcdefg. Since TG is an instance of what I 
called a ‘mixed’ mental state pragmatism, its vindication should also support 
the genus position it is a species of. I end by considering what the right 
metaphysics of trust tells us about what are our reasons to trust (and thus 
what it says about h).  
2. Doxasticism about Trust 
Here is why I think people have sometimes been drawn to the idea that trust 
has at least some belief-like properties, or involves belief (even if it is not to be 
fully identified with it):  Trust looks to be sensitive to counter-evidence. When 
you trust someone, you seem to represent them as having the properties of 
being trustworthy. And thus on attaining damning evidence that that the 
trusted party is not in fact trustworthy, our trust disappears. That’s what 
explains, for instance, why we don’t tend to trust people or institutions that 
have violated our trust, as per when we stop trusting a Chancellor of the 
Exchequer when we know she’s recently committed fraud.  To illustrate with 
a case from Richard Holton, suppose you are playing a game where you are 
required to let yourself fall and be caught by a fellow player. It seems 
appropriate to say here that you are required to trust the fellow player to 
catch you. But supposing you have overwhelming evidence that your fellow 
player won’t catch you: Can you still trust your fellow player? It seems you 
cannot. Your having evidence against the fact that they will catch you seems 
to militate against (if not completely destroy) the possibility of trust. Further, 
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it seems infelicitous to say, for instance, that Amanda trusts James to feed her 
cat while she is on holiday while Amanda believes that James will not feed 
her cat. It seems infelicitous to say, for instance, that Roger trusts his teacher 
when she says that Henry VII lost the battle of Bosworth when he believes 
that Henry VII won that battle. And what can explain this other than the fact 
that trust has a cognitive, belief-like component? 
In other words, only a doxastic account of trust (one where trust is belief or 
involves belief or has a belief-like component) can explain the following: 
f. Trust that S will φ is incompatible with belief that S will not-φ. 
g. Trust in S’s testimony that p is incompatible with belief that not p.  
 
To see why, consider how non-doxastic accounts attempt to explain f and g. In 
particular, consider Richard Holton’s very influential account according to 
which trust is a higher-order stance (a “participant” stance) with respect to the 
evidential standards our lower-order beliefs about the objects (individual 
people, groups, or institutions) of our trust are subject to, this combined with 
reliance on the individual (trust is not mere reliance, according to Holton, as 
per d). His idea is, roughly, that though we can’t choose our beliefs (our 
beliefs are not under direct voluntary control) we can choose our higher-order 
epistemic stance toward them15. So that when we don’t have a belief that our 
trusted friend is not trustworthy, we can choose to have a more lenient 
epistemic stance toward him, such that we can believe that our friend is 
innocent of a crime even when others would fail to believe it. And further we 
can choose whether or not we rely on him. 																																																								
15  Explicitly echoing here van Fraassen’s “stance voluntarism” (cf. van Fraassen 
1982, 2002). 
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In other words, trust that S will φ is incompatible with belief that S will not- 
φ, but it is not incompatible with an absence of doxastic attitude toward 
whether S will φ, suspension of judgement as to whether S will φ, or indeed 
belief that S will φ. Holton in fact uses the case of the game above also as his 
opening example, motivating the view that we can trust at will. Remove the 
belief that the fellow player will not catch me, and it seems that we can decide 
whether or not we trust. This, as I mentioned, is feature a about trust that I 
think needs explaining. And if a is true, as we’ll discuss in the next section, 
then features b, c and d need explaining too. And the reason that we can trust 
at will for Holton is that trust is a particular stance, a stance we can take up at 
will (absence certain constraints)16 and that we can choose on who we rely. 
But the problem for Holton is whether he has really explained f and g. Holton 
claims he wants to avoid the conclusion that he has really given us a “recipe” 
for believing something we want to believe at will; a recipe like the following: 
“Find someone who will tell you it is true and trust them to speak truly and 
sincerely” (Holton 1994, p. 12). If his account has the consequence that belief 
is voluntary, then he thinks the account is deficient (since he thinks that belief 
is not voluntary). He says two things in his defence as regards his account 
entailing doxastic voluntarism: first, that there are limits on whom we can 
trust to do what, and “one of the constraints on trusting you to do something 
is the lack of a belief that you will not do it” (Holton 1994, p. 12, my 
emphasis). So I can’t acquire (at will) the appropriate epistemic stance toward 
my friend (I can’t choose to trust them, in other words) if I believe that my 																																																								
16 As I mentioned, its being a participant stance involves the participants thinking it 
appropriate to have certain reactive attitudes on discovery of a betrayal of trust. 
	 14	
friend is untrustworthy. I can’t trust him to give me back my book if I believe 
that he won’t. 
But the question here precisely is the following: how can trust can have such a 
constraint – be sensitive to whether I do not believe the person will be 
trustworthy – if trust is not a belief (or at least involves belief)?  Just asserting 
that the constraint applies does not explain it17.  
Second, Holton tells us that the recipe won’t allow us to “directly, and 
immediately” acquire beliefs18, since (to put it bluntly) we’ll have to find a 
friend to tell us the thing we want to believe. But Holton alludes to the idea 
that we can in principle “trust ourselves” and that at times we must. Why 
can’t we tell ourselves what we want to hear, and then decide to trust 
ourselves? Won’t that fit the formula?  Nothing in Holton’s account seems to 
preclude it, unless we have reason to not to believe that we will act in accord 
with our trust (but then how could we trust ourselves?). Nor does it help to 
appeal to the reliance part of Holton’s account, as per: 
When I rely on someone to do something, I work this reliance into my 
plans: I plan on the supposition that they will do it. But if I believe that 
they won't do it, then that too is something I should work into my 
plans. So if I rely you to do something but believe that you won't, I am 
led to incoherence: I have to work into my plans both the supposition 
																																																								
17 A related point is made by Keren: “supporters [of Holton’s account] must explain why 
trusting a speaker to speak knowledgeably and sincerely, without believing that she will, 
should result in believing what she says” (Keren 2014, p. 2598); cf. also Hieronymi 2008. 	
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that you will do it, and the supposition that you will not. (Holton 1994 
p. 72)19 
The problem is that according to Holton I can voluntarily change my higher-
order epistemic stance (part of my taking a ‘participant stance’) toward 
whether someone will do something. This is why for Holton trust is not just 
reliance. So suppose that if I took a more lenient higher-order epistemic stance 
toward whether someone will do something, I will drop the belief that they 
will not do it. If this is known to me, then there is nothing that prevents me 
from trusting you to do something even though I believe you will not do it. 
All I need to do is modify my higher-order attitude so that I drop the belief 
that you will not do it: I am not ‘led to incoherence’. Put differently, if part of 
why we can trust at will is that we can modify our higher-order epistemic 
stances at will, then we will have more voluntary control over trust than f and 
g predict – since having control over higher-order epistemic stances will mean 
having control (at least sometimes) over dropping first-order beliefs that not-
p.  
According to TG trust is a p-lief. And one p-lieves that p just in case ascribing 
belief that p is the proximate best way to explain a certain set of actions. It is 
clear that a straight doxastic account can explain f and g. Can TG explain 
them? It can, since if we already know that S believes that not-p, then an 
explanation of S’s actions that involves a belief that p cannot be the best 
explanation of S’s actions. It cannot even be the best proximate explanation, 
since even if belief was rightly to be thought of in pragmatist terms, then S’s 
																																																								
19 Thanks to [anonymous] for discussion.  
	 16	
belief that not-p would come with a set of actions that we know the positing 
of belief that not-p best explains.  
To illustrate: when I trust that my friend is innocent of a crime, I can choose to 
act in such a way that my actions would be explicable only if the “belief” that 
my friend is innocent is attributed to me. But belief cannot be attributed in 
such a pragmatist manner (since we cannot believe at will), so we call this 
state trust (identical to what I’ve called p-lief) not belief. I could not trust that 
my friend is innocent of a crime if I believed that he is not innocent.  That’s 
because if I believed that he was not innocent, my actions would either be 
such that ascribing “belief” that he was innocent would not be the best 
explanation of those actions, or else we would know something about me that 
would make it the case that ascribing “belief” that he was innocent would not 
be the best explanation of my actions.  
I think the same issue arises, incidentally, for accounts according to which 
trust is (at least sometimes or partly) the attitude of acceptance that we 
discussed in opening (an especially interesting such account is found in Frost-
Arnold 2014). According to Frost-Arnold, trust as acceptance must account 
for the intuition that trust that p is incompatible with the belief that not-p:  
…the epistemic constraints on acceptance nicely accounts for this 
intuition; one cannot trust B to φ if one takes oneself to have 
overwhelming evidence that B will not φ, because one cannot accept 
that p if one takes oneself to have overwhelming evidence that p is not 
even approximately true. Frost-Arnold 2014 p. 1968.  
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But why think that acceptance has to have this constraint if acceptance is not a 
belief? Surely we can decide to act on known falsehoods (and we can have 
non-epistemic reason to accept a falsehood), so the fact that acceptance can 
directly lead to action (while this might distinguish it from supposition) is not 
enough to guarantee the applicability of the constraint. For example, I can 
accept that – despite the overwhelming evidence20 – I will get better from my 
illness if accepting that I will get better will lead me to a course of action that 
will increase the probability (however small) that I will get better. And surely 
our acceptances can be incompatible with each other, at least across contexts; 
as Frost-Arnold admits: “sometimes we adopt a cognitive state of acceptance, 
which is not subject to the ideals of consistency and coherence across 
contexts” (Frost-Arnold 2014, p. 1965). If even acceptances need not be 
consistent (across contexts) then it seems hard to explain why acceptances 
need to be consistent with beliefs (which are not context dependent).  Again 
just asserting that the constraint applies does not explain why it does.  
 
 
3. Non-Doxasticism about Trust 
The central problem with doxastic accounts of trust is that they cannot 
account for the claim that we can at times trust at will, in a way in which we 
cannot believe at will. This is data-point a which I mentioned any theory of 
trust needs to explain. And if it is the case that we can trust at will, then (as 
I’ve mentioned) an account of trust will also have to explain the following: 
																																																								
20 Evidence good enough for knowledge.  
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b. We can trust against our (subjective) evidence. 
c. We can trust therapeutically.  
d. Our trust can be betrayed; trust is not reliance 
 
b is a corollary of a, since if we could not but trust in line with our (subjective) 
evidence, then trust would not be under any voluntary control21. We can only 
trust therapeutically – that is, trust someone we deem currently less than fully 
trustworthy such that they become trustworthy – if we can choose to trust. 
Slightly more controversially, since this assumes something like an ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ principle, it seems wrong to say that our trust can be betrayed 
(in some deontic sense of ‘betrayed’) if trust is not something we can control. 
A further feature of trust that makes trust look be something other than belief, 
but is not a corollary of a, is the following (also previously mentioned): 
e. Trust does not survive too much reflective scrutiny. 
 
By ‘reflective scrutiny’ I mean here the kind of reflection aimed at settling (for 
the subject doing the reflection) the question as to whether to trust22. As 
Annette Baier puts it: “Trust is a fragile plant, which may not endure 
inspection of its roots, even when they were, before the inspection, quite 
healthy” (Baier 1987, p. 260). These two claims seem incompatible, for 
example: I trust James to return my book tomorrow. I am going to spend the 
evening wondering whether James is going to return my book tomorrow.  
 
																																																								
21 Here is a nice articulation of b from Paul Faulkner: “[T]rust need not satisfy either a positive 
or a negative evidence condition: it need not be based on evidence and can demonstrate a 
willful insensitivity to the evidence. Indeed there is a tension between acting on trust and 
acting on evidence that is illustrated in the idea that one does not actually trust someone to 
do something if one only believes they will do it when one has evidence that they will” 
(Faulkner 2007, p. 876).  
22 This would be compatible with the subject reflecting on the evidence in order to find the 
best evidence in order to persuade others to trust. Thanks to [anonymous] for this point. 
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The most explicit doxasticist attempt to give an account of trust which can 
explain these features is Keren’s. His view, which has aspects in common 
with Zagzebski 2012 and McMyler 2011, is the following: 
A trusts B to phi only if A believes that B is trustworthy, such that in 
virtue of A’s belief about B’s trustworthiness, A sees herself as having 
reason to rely on B’s phi’ing without taking precautions against the 
possibility that B will not phi, and only if A indeed acts on, or is 
responsive to, reasons against taking precautions. (Keren 2014, p. 
2609). 
Keren calls this a “preemptive reasons account” of trust. The thought is, very 
briefly, that – drawing on Raz’s (1990) account of preemptive reasons for 
action – the reasons generated by trust are analogous to those generated by an 
authoritative command. This in the sense that an authoritative command 
gives us (according to Raz) a higher-order reason against acting for certain 
other reasons. In the case of trust, these latter reasons are reasons that prevent 
one from “taking precautions” against the possibility that the trusted party 
will not act as one “trusts”, according to Keren. In other words, if you trust 
James (in Keren’s analysis, you believe that James is trustworthy), you also 
fail to take precautions against the possibility that your belief that James is 
trustworthy is false – that is, you refrain from collecting and reflecting on 
available evidence relevant to that proposition.23  
I want to now show how TG fares better than the Preemptive Reasons 
Account in explaining abcde. I take it that a non-augmented doxastic account 																																																								
23 A similar account is offered both by Zagzebski (2012) – especially as regards speaker-trust – 
and McMyler (2011).  
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is going to have trouble explaining abcde and that Keren’s account qua 
doxastic account can explain f and g. I have argued that TG can explain f and g 
in the last section.  
Let’s take e first. 
e. Trust does not survive too much reflective scrutiny. 
 
Keren’s account can explain e because too much reflective scrutiny is a 
violation of the pre-emptive command.  
TG can explain e because too much reflective scrutiny about whether p is 
incompatible with p-lief about p. If belief was to be determined on purely 
pragmatist grounds, then the fact of your constantly searching for new 
evidence as to whether p is best explained by an attitude of not yet believing 
that p.  
Both accounts can explain e. The contest here is tied. So let’s move on to b. 
b. We can trust against the evidence. 
 
The preemptive reasons part of Keren’s account is precisely designed such 
that it can explain b. We can trust against the evidence on this account 
because we have higher-order reason that commands us to ignore any first 
order-evidence we might attain against p (and/or to fail to obtain such 
evidence). 
The trouble is whether we might think that an account of trust must explain a 
slightly stronger claim: 
b’ We can trust against our total evidence.  
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By ‘total evidence’ I mean evidence that includes ‘higher-order’ evidence, or 
epistemic reason.  B’ is a corollary of a since if we can trust at will, then we 
can trust for reasons that go against epistemic reasons, whatever the order.  
TG can explain b and b’. This is because we can trust at will according to TG.  
We can trust against the (total) evidence by acting in such a way that the best 
explanation of our actions is to ascribe a p-lief to us.  
I think that gives TG an advantage over the preemptive reasons account. And 
I think it does so even if explaining b’ is not a genuine desideratum for an 
account of trust. That’s because the way that the preemptive reasons account 
explains b is via an attempt to appeal to high-order evidence, and not via its 
ability to explain a and thus that it can explain b.24 In fact Keren’s account 
cannot explain a – Keren himself does not attempt to. He does address c, 
however. 
c. We can trust therapeutically.  
 
Here he rules that the notion of therapeautic trust25 is mistaken, or that it is far 
from obvious that there is such a phenomenon when taken to be different 
from merely acting as if one trusts. He asks us to consider the standard 
example of parents who trust their teenage daughter to look after the house in 
order to promote trustworthiness in her. He thinks the example does not give 
us a clear-cut example of therapeutic trust (where the latter involves absence 
of belief that the trusted party is trustworthy). First, because he thinks it is not 
clear whether we are not ascribing belief (or some degree of belief) to the 																																																								
24 Keren and Holton’s accounts have this feature in common.  
25 Frost-Arnold (2014) identifies what she calls “corrective trust” and “coping trust” as species 
of therapeutic trust. If she’s right that there are sub-versions of therapeutic trust, that further 
vindicates my claim that (c) and (a) are intimately connected. 
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parents when we ascribe trust to them. Second, because, to the degree that we 
think that the parents do fail to have the belief that the daughter is 
trustworthy, we might legitimately wonder whether they really trust their 
daughter, “or merely act as if they do” (Keren 2014, p. 2610).  
Keren’s objection takes the form of a challenge here. He does not show that 
the notion of therapeutic trust is somewhat incoherent or unstable. Rather, he 
challenges us: present us with a putative case of therapeutic trust which 
cannot be analysed into either involving belief on the part of trusting party, or 
involving non-genuine trust – acting as if they trust. Take Holton’s game 
where you ‘decide’ to trust by allowing one self to fall and be caught by a 
fellow player behind you.  In the absence of belief that the fellow player will 
catch you and you fall anyway, can you be really be said to genuinely trust, or 
merely to act as if you trust?  
I think that TG can answer this challenge by showing how it relies on the 
faulty assumption that if the reason why one is predicating trust is to explain 
actions then the person on whom we are predicating trust cannot be genuinely 
trusting, but merely “acting as if one trusts”. And it’s enough to answer the 
challenge to allay Keren’s objection to therapeutic trust. Suppose that we are 
pragmatists about belief. If we are, then the line between acting as if one 
believes and genuine belief is going to involve a difference of degree, not 
kind. That is, doxastic pragmatists could make a distinction between merely 
acting as if one believes and genuine belief.  However, to make sense of the 
phenomenon of acting as if one believes, they will appeal to the fact that one’s 
actions do not require the ascription of belief in order to make them rational. 
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The existence of the possibility of pretending to believe (or acting as if one 
believes) raises the bar as to what is required in order for belief to be ascribed. 
But this does not mean that one’s beliefs are not a function of one’s actions 
(internal or external), for the pragmatist. But according to the account I’m 
defending here, p-lief (and not belief) is a function of one’s actions. Belief 
resists pragmatist treatment, since it is involuntary. What we are ascribing the 
parent, when we say that she therapeutically trusts her daughter is p-lief, not 
belief (according to this account). To trust is thus a species of acting as if – one 
trusts when one’s actions are so consistent with belief that p, that belief that p 
becomes necessary to preserve the ascription of rational action (put 
differently, the fact of our beliefs not being under our voluntary control puts a 
break on a comprehensive principle of charity which demands assuming 
rationality). Like with pragmatism about belief, the difference between acting 
as if one believes that p, and one acts as if that p is going to be one of degree. It 
is then not an objection to the account if we are inclined to judge that the 
parent acts as if he believes that his daughter is trustworthy, but does not 
genuinely believe that she is. If he acts as if he believes her to be trustworthy 
comprehensively enough, then he p-lieves that she is trustworthy. That is, he 
trusts her. And he can p-lieve that she is trustworthy, even when there is 
(known) absence of belief that she is trustworthy. 
The fact that Keren’s explanation of b does not depend on its explanation of a, 
and the account’s concomitant failure to explain a means that the Preemptive 
reasons account will not be able to explain:  
d Our trust can be betrayed; trust is not reliance. 
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It’s perhaps no surprise then that Keren himself does not attempt to show that 
his account can explain d. According to TG trust is not mere reliance because 
it is not an involuntary state like belief. We choose to put our trust in people 
(sometimes against the evidence that they are trustworthy) and thus we can 
rightly feel resentment when our trust is betrayed. However, we can, of 
course, also choose to rely on others – James can choose to rely on his new 
bookshelf to house his books – so the difference between reliance and trust 
cannot be just down to our ability to trust at will. The difference will be down 
to the content of respective attitudes of trust and reliance. In the former and 
not in the latter is someone S represented as being trustworthy (bookshelves 
are just not the sort of thing that can bear the property of being trustworthy). 
Any doxastic account has this last feature, but since belief is involuntary, it 
won’t be enough for it to explain why we can rightly feel betrayed by 
breeches of trust.  
 
5. Conclusion: Reasons to Trust? 
What does the metaphysics of trust tell us are the reasons of trust if TG is 
true? According to both Jones (1996) and Keren (2014), what makes trust 
justified is determined in large part by what is the correct metaphysics of 
trust. I guess this is because it is assumed that if trust is a belief, and only if it 
is a belief, then trust is made rational or justified by epistemic 
reason/evidence. This is to assume that there can be no non-epistemic reasons 
for belief, and no epistemic reasons for actions, and I’m not sure we can 
assume these claims for free. Nevertheless, assuming them to be true, if trust 
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is a p-lief then what kind of reason justifies p-lief? Or, put differently, what 
kind of reason do pragmatists about belief think justifies belief: practical 
reason or epistemic reason (evidence)? It seems to me that nothing prevents a 
pragmatist about belief from thinking that evidence solely justifies belief. 
Even if they end up accepting that there are times when we can believe at will 
(by acting in such a way that ascribing belief would be the only way to 
explain those actions) and as such that belief can be sensitive to non-epistemic 
considerations, beliefs arrived at in this way can be thought by the pragmatist 
to be always unjustified if they are at odds with the available evidence. As I 
mentioned in section 1, the fact that belief is a state whose ascription is there 
to explain our actions does not mean that belief is itself an action, solely 
evaluable in non-epistemic terms.  
According to TG, however, one can trust against the evidence, and trust at 
will26. If the proponent of TG holds that only evidence can justify p-lief, she 
will be forced to concede that such trust is always unjustified. And this seems 
wrong. Trust – against the evidence – seems not only possible, but justified on 
occasion. But under TG nothing rules out the possibility that the reasons for 
trust are all things considered reasons and that epistemic consideration can 
sometimes compete (sometimes winning, sometimes losing) with non-
epistemic considerations in our deliberations as to whether to trust. Our 
judgement about whether one ought to trust (because determined by our 
judgement as to whether one ought to trust all things considered) is then 
determined by the particular pushes and pulls of the different kinds of reason 																																																								
26 That is, that we can at least sometimes trust at will (thanks to Rowland Stout for 
the clarification).  
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in any given situation. So one cannot give a general prescription as to what 
kinds of reason justify trust – the answer is simply that sometimes epistemic 
reasons do, and sometimes non-epistemic reasons do.  
Can epistemically justified belief be generated by states that are justified by 
non-epistemic reasons? I personally see no reason why that cannot be the 
case. However, even if justified belief can be generated only by states justified 
by epistemic reason, this does not mean that TG is incompatible with h – since 
according to TG epistemic reasons are sometimes the reasons for trust, and so 
trust can generate epistemically justified belief, even if the latter can only be 
generated by epistemically justified states. 
To conclude, then, I think that TG can handle all of abcedgh better than any 
currently proposed alternative. This means that TG can handle the central 
paradox with respect to trust, nicely summarised by Baker with this: 
Someone might try to distinguish trust from genuine or full belief. 
Trust, on such a view, would be a watered down variant of belief, 
something like pretence or acting-as-if something were true. But this is 
to view trust as a non-serious form of belief. Whereas what one 
demands from one’s friends is belief, not pretence, that one is innocent. 
And what some outsiders find amazing is just the fact that serious 
belief continues in the fact of rising evidence against it (Baker 1987, p. 
9). 
What I take to be the basic insight underscoring TG is that one can claim that 
trust is something slightly different from ordinary belief, but yet is not just 
pretence or “acting-as-if” something were true: in a pragmatic picture of our 
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mental states we can still make a distinction between one’s believing that p, 
and acting as if one believes that p. The difference between the two might not 
be a difference in kind but it is a difference nonetheless. As such, p-lief is no 
less “serious” than belief. It’s a very serious and difficult27 demand to make of 
our friends that they p-lieve us to be innocent, but when we heed it we can 
with effort maintain it in the face of rising evidence against it – no matter 
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